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NOTES
The Law of Diminishing Privacy Rights: Encryption
Escrow and the Dilution of Associational Freedoms in
Cyberspace
I. INTRODUCTION
Two of the driving forces behind the original migration of the
Puritans from England to America' were the freedom to associate and the
right to be left alone.2 These freedoms, directly3 and indirectly 4 expressed
in the United States Constitution, are as equally relevant today in the
migration towards cyberspace.5 Yet, these freedoms are at the heart of the
privacy debate between individual computer users and proposed
government control of American electronic communications through key
escrow of encryption devices. 6
1 Donald S. Lutz, The Mayflower Compact, in ROOTS OF THE REPUBLIC 17, 18
(Stephen L. Schechter et al. eds., 1990) (stating "[t]hey had come to America for religious
liberty; and central to their notion of liberty was the ability to create and run their own churches
independent of the Church of England.").
2 Id. at 22-23 (citing The Mayflower Compact, November 11, 1620: "Having
undertaken, for the glorie of God, and advancements of the Christian faith... [we] covenant &
combine our selves tether into a civil body politick; for our better ordering, & preservation &
furtherance of the ends aforesaid .... ).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; ... or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble .... "); see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").
4 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (finding that "the Fourth
Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional 'right to privacy."). However,
"[tihat Amendment protects individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion
.Id.
5 See M. Ethan Katsh, Law Reviews and the Migration to Cyberspace, 29 AKRON
L. REv. 115 (1996) (demonstrating the abundant and frequent use of information in
cyberspace).
6 "Information transmitted electronically is often safeguarded through a widely
available method known as encryption, which renders the information unintelligible to anyone
without the ability to decrypt the message. Law enforcement agencies argue that unregulated
encryption [encryption for which the government cannot decipher without a key, most likely to
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Encryption is an important function to the secure and steady
growth of electronic communications into the next century.7 Such
communications have seen explosive growth8 based on the advent of the
Internet. 9 The number of global Internet users will top one billion in the
twenty-first century. 10 The influx of users can be attributed to the speed
and efficiency of conducting online business and personal communications
through e-mail exchanges,11 World Wide Web servers, 12 Bulletin Board
Systems (BBS), 13  and Internet Relay Chat Rooms. 14  These
be held in escrow] hinders their ability to prevent crime .... Proponents ofencryption argue
that privacy, security, and constitutional concerns outweigh law enforcement's fears,
guaranteeing the ability to communicate confidentially." Jill M. Ryan, Freedom to Speak
Unintelligibly: The First Amendment Implications of Government Controlled Encryption, 4
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1165 (1996). Organizations in support of electronic
communications privacy issues include, but are not limited to, the American Civil Liberties
Union, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, The Privacy Coalition, Human Rights Watch, as well
as numerous encryption scientists (see infra Part 11: The Encryption Debate). Organizations in
support of key escrow encryption devices include, but are not limited to, the FBI, the NSA, and
the Executive Branch of the United States Government (for further discussion of escrow devices
see infra Part II: The Encryption Debate).
7 See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (1996) (providing a comprehensive
source of computer-oriented definitions for framing its legal analysis of the issue of computer
decency, and subsequently noting the estimated growth of computers linked to the Internet from
fewer than 300 in 1981 to more than 9,400,000 (not including individual computers linked to
the Internet by telephone based modems) in 1996).
8 Id. at 831 (estimating that the number of Internet communications will grow to
200 million by 1999).
9 Techweb Technology Encyclopedia (visited Nov. 8, 1997)
<http://www.techweb.com/encyclopedia/deftneterm.cgi?LESSONSRNTERNET> [hereinafter
Techweb](finding over 100,000 small networks for commercial, academic or government
purposes, from more than 100 countries, are interconnected into one large network known as
the Internet).
10 Marianne Lavelle, Next Rights Battle Is Going Online: Infonauts Say Cybercops
Trample Speech, Assembly and Other Rights, NAT'L L.J., July 25, 1994, at Al.
I See Techweb, supra note 9 (explaining under the Encyclopedia section of the
website, that as on-line services connected to the Internet, each could use the Internet as a
gateway to send messages to addresses at other service locations).
12 See Techweb, supra note 9 (defining servers as service providers that provide an
information exchange using a common language which is accessible to the World Wide Web
(www)).
13See Techweb, supra note 9 (defining BBS as a system pre-dating the World Wide
Web as a separate network from which computer users can directly dial up daily news and
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communication outlets offer an unprecedented ability for individuals with
common interests to associate regardless of physical location. Ann
Beeson, the Justice William Brennan First Amendment Fellow with the
American Civil Liberties Union, states "[c]yberspace' 5 is probably the
richest source of creative, diverse, empowering and democratizing
communication ever to connect people across the globe .... It is a tool
for community organizing and citizen involvement.'
16
With increased capability for community communication,
however, looms a threat to individual anonymity and privacy.1 7 While the
positive force behind the Internet has spurred economic, social, and
governmental growth, the risk to personal and business security has also
grown.18 Individuals and businesses are the possible targets of electronic-
based criminals such as recreational hackers (entering computer
information systems without authorization), financial criminals
(manipulating credit, financial, or service-oriented information), and those
engaged in industrial espionage, terrorism, national intelligence, and
informational warfare (disrupting governmental or economic information
systems). 19
information on a wide range of specific topics from financial news and gardening to
pornography, sexual abuse, and witchcraft).
14 See Techweb, supra note 9 (defining chat rooms as services available through
another network known as Telnet which allows multi-users to "talk" through simultaneous text
postings).
15 See Anne Meredith Fulton, Cyberspace and the Internet: Who Will be the
Privacy Police?, 3 Comm. L. CONSPECTUS 63 (1995) (stating that "The word 'Cyberspace' has
become the household word of the 1990's, though most people have no idea what Cyberspace
is or how it works."). Many know that Cyberspace is the information highway where ATM
machines, telephone calls, fax transmissions, and computers somehow magically travel. In
reality, Cyberspace consists of electron states, microwaves, magnetic fields and light pulses. Id.
As such, it is the repository for all digitally and electronically transferred information. Id.
16 Ann Beeson, Top Ten Threats to Civil Liberties in Cyberspace, 23 SPG HUM.
RTS. 10 (1996).
17 See Fulton, supra note 15, at 63.
18 See President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (last modified
Sept. 8, 1998) <http://www.pccip.gov> (explaining that the PCCIP was commissioned in July
1996 to create a strategy to combat the vulnerabilities of the national infrastructure due to
electronic threats and was completed in June 1997).
'
91d"
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Ofne safeguard from such criminals is data encryption. Data
encryption, or the science of cryptography,2 ° transmits data from one user
to another in secret code that can only be decrypted by a secret key.2'
Although encryption devices are crucial to the continued growth
and protection of communications on the Internet 2 the proliferation and
utilization of "strong" or uncrackable encryption software and hardware
may decrease law enforcement's capacity to deter crime.23 Encryption's
secrecy essentially works against the police.24 The traditional law
enforcement surveillance technique of wiretapping may become
increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to employ due to virtually
unbreakable encryption codes.
25
Currently, exported encryption codes, unlike encryption marketed
domestically, are restricted to a "breakable" strength by law. 26 The FBI,
the National Security Agency (NSA), as well as the Clinton
Administration, however, have called for government control27 over all
encryption in the name of national security. 28 The current proposals call
20 See William A. Hodkowski, The Future of Internet Security: How New
Technologies Will Shape the Internet and Affect the Law, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 217, 227 (1997) (stating that without encryption, an e-mail message can be read by
a third party as easily as a mailman can read a postcard).21Id.
22 See Hodkowski, supra note 20, at 219.
23 See A. Michael Froomkin, It Came From Planet Clipper: The Battle Over
Cryptographic Key "Escrow ", U. CI. LEGAL F. 15, 16 (1996) (discussing law enforcement's
difficulty in eavesdropping on foreign communications due to encryption).
24Id.
25id.
26 See Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, 974 F. Supp. 1288, 1291, 1293
(N.D. Cal. 1997) (stating that jurisdiction over encryption export is under the Export
Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. 2401 (1991), and the Export Administration Regulations,
15 C.F.R. 730 (1997), and that restriction of key code strength must be under a 56-bit key
length). 27 See Froomkin, supra note 23, at 16-23. "Although there are no legal controls on
the production or use of strong cryptographic products by U.S. citizens or residents within the
U.S., these products cannot be exported or sold to foreigners." Id. at 16.
28 See Jeri Clausing, FB.L, Security Chiefs Ask Senate for all Keys to all
Encrypted Data (visited July 10, 1997) <http://www.nytimes.com/library/cyber/week/
071097encrypt.ht> (stating that the director of the FBI, Louis B. Freeh, argued before the Senate
in support of a Clinton Administration plan for regulation of encryption by a "key recovery"
system or "trap door" mechanism to alleviate virtually uncrackable codes for law enforcement
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on software manufacturers to include a key escrow device in all future
programs.29 Key escrow proposals as currently conceived, however, will
result in suppressing the voices of computer users who use anonymity to
communicate and form associations in cyberspace.30
Providing the government access to private communications
through key escrow of encryption may be unconstitutional under the First
Amendment's right to free association. 31 The Supreme Court decision in
NAACP v. Alabama32 held that, absent a sufficient governmental interest,
involuntary disclosure of membership lists to state surveillance agencies
violates the right to assemble anonymously. Akin to such involuntary
disclosure, encryption key escrow poses similar problems for electronic
communicators who wish to protect their associations in privacy.33 The
ability to communicate anonymously is the basis for the associational
survival of many cyber-based groups.3 4 Any requirements of identification
in its effort to protect the nation from "terrorism and organized crime in the next century"). Cf.,
Jeri Clausing, U.S. Official Says Clinton Wants Market-Driven Encryption Policy (visited Oct.
9, 1997) <http://www.nytimes.com/books/sea... yberlib+17609+8+ wAAA+market-driv>
(stating that the Administration's key escrow plan is calling for a key recovery mechanism to be
built into government used software).
29 See Henry R. King, Big Brother, The Holding Company: A Review of Key-
Escrow Encryption Technology, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 224, 251 (1995)
(finding key escrow, or a key escrow device, analogous to "a school locker which has a master
key allowing a suspicious teacher to search the locker.").
30 Id. at 259 (quoting Laurence H. Tribe, noted Constitutional Law Professor from
Harvard Law School: "This Constitution's protections for the freedoms of speech, press,
petition, and assembly, and its protections against unreasonable searches and seizures... shall
be construed as fully applicable without regard to the technological method or medium through
which the information content is generated, stored, altered, transmitted, or controlled.").
31 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (holding that Alabama did not have
a sufficient interest in the disclosure of the addresses of Alabama membership of the NAACP
and that such disclosure would chill the freedom of association).32 id.
33 Jeri Clausing, Online Groups Mount an Effort to Fight Clinton on Encryption,
(visited Sept. 21, 1997) <http://search.nytimes.com/books/search/bin/fastweb?getdoc+cyber-
lib+cyber-lib+ 17392+5+wAAA+groups-and--clinton--eneryption> (discussing the battle over
the effects of encryption technology).34 See A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor Is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper
Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 709, 817-18 (1995) (discussing the need for
anonymity and quoting Lawrence H. Tribe as stating that "[anonymity is] essential for the
survival of [some] dissident movements.").
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will not only "chill" private discussions, the essence of cyberspace, but
also will intrude on the right to assemble in anonymity. 5
Purportedly, the government's ability to obtain a person's true
identity under a key escrow system will be filtered through Fourth
Amendment wiretap procedures.36 These procedures would thus be less
intrusive than the arbitrary disclosure of membership lists in NAACP. The
Fifth Circuit decision in Steve Jackson Games v. United States Secret
Service,37 however, demonstrates that traditional wiretap safeguards are
not in place to protect against involuntary disclosure of electronic
communicator's identities.38 In this case, the court determined that the
Wire and Electronic Communications and Interception of Oral
Communications Act of 1996 did not extend constitutional protections
afforded by traditional wiretap procedures to users of electronic
communications. 39 The court found that stored data transmission, unlike
written or aural data "in transmission," was not protected by government
search and seizure laws.40 Because it is virtually impossible to eavesdrop
on any electronic communication "in transit," as almost all electronic
communications are effectively "in storage," electronic communications
are vulnerable to search and seizure without privacy protection.
This note examines how in cyberspace, the rights of computer
users to associate anonymously, free from discretionary governmental
35 See id. at 817 (expanding on Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 628
(1976), (Brennan, J. concurring in part)); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-24
(holding that the NAACP did not have to disclose membership lists on freedom of association
grounds). 36 Id. at 789-91 (discussing the possible classifications and their ramifications under
Title MII of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2510-2521 (1988
& supp. V 1993) as a "wire communication" which would demand a high level of statutory and
constitutional protection such as that required for wire tapping, or as "electronic communication"
which would receive a lower level of protection).
37 Steve Jackson Games v. United States Secret Service, 816 F. Supp. 432, 442
(W.D. Tex. 1993), afid, 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that the government's search of
subscriber's unopened e-mail and other communications contained within a seized electronic
Bulletin Board System computer did not constitute a wiretap protected "interception" of a
communication).38 id.
39 id.
40 See Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 459.
120 [Vol. XV
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surveillance, are compromised by key escrow of encryption. This is due
to the lack of traditional wiretap procedures to protect all types of stored
electronic communications. Part II defines the Internet and encryption
devices. It identifies the important role encryption technology plays in
electronic communication, as well as the controversy surrounding the
implementation of key escrow devices. Part III discusses anonymous
association and privacy on the Internet. Part IV (a) describes how
traditional common law from NAACP v. Alabama, and its progeny, cases
concerning association and anonymity, are applicable to a new medium
such as the Internet. Part IV (b) examines national security concerns, as
well as a brief history of search and seizure laws which serve as a
backdrop to the statutory law that now governs electronic
communications. Part IV(c) examines the role of current statutory law and
the Fifth Circuit's ruling in Steve Jackson Games v. United States Secret
Service,4' which arguably create a void of protection against warrantless
searches. Part V concludes that without statutory protection, the need for
unrestricted encryption is essential for electronic communicators to
associate in anonymity.
II. THE INTER.NET, ENCRYPTION, AND CONTROVERSY
The Internet provides a rich platform for association in cyberspace
due to the nature of its network foundation.42 "From its inception, the
network was designed to be a decentralized, self-maintaining series of
redundant links between computers and computer networks, capable of
rapidly transmitting communications without direct human involvement
or control ....43
The primary method to access the Internet is through direct
connection to a "host site" within the Internet using a modem or cable
41 Id.
42 Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 824 (defining many of the prevalent features of the
Internet which are crucial in application of law to this medium). "The Internet is not a physical
or tangible entity, but rather a giant network which interconnects innumerable smaller groups
of linked computer networks. It is thus a network of networks." Id. at 830.
43 1d. at 831.
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connection." Access to the Internet is becoming more readily available
to individuals through employment, school, municipal and community
centers, libraries, and even "storefront 'computer coffee shops.'
45
Individual modems or cable access directly links individuals to the Internet
through non-commercial Internet Service Providers (ISP's) or through
commercial "online service" companies which provide proprietary on-line
services and "chat" forums for subscribers." An alternative access option
is one "of the thousands of local dial-in computer services, often called
'bulletin board systems' or 'BBS's."' Here, subscribers that share a
common interest on anything from IRS frustrations to gardening to sexual-
abuse victim advocacy can exchange information through posting general
messages to all subscribers or specific messages to individual e-mail
addresses.47
A key method of protecting the privacy of information that travels
throughout this vast system of communication is by encrypting the
communications.48  Software that provides encryption protection
scrambles the readable "plaintext" messages of a computer user into
4Id. at 832.
451d. at 832-33.
4 Id. at 833 (describing the various national services such as "America Online,
CompuServe, the Microsoft Network and Prodigy" which have close to twelve million U.S.
subscribers).
47 See Reno, 929 F. Supp at 834-35 (stating that a BBS service, also called
"Usenet" or "[u]ser-sponsored newsgroups[,] are among the most popular and widespread
applications of Internet services, covering all imaginable topics of interest to users.").
"[Nlewsgroups are open discussions and exchanges on particular topics . . . [W]hen an
individual user with' access to a Usenet server [also known as a host computer to which
individuals can access] posts a message to a newsgroup, the message is automatically forwarded
to all adjacent Usenet servers that furnish access to the newsgroup, and it is then propagated to
the servers adjacent to those servers, etc." Id. "There are newsgroups on more than fifteen
thousand different subjects." Id. "In 1994, approximately 70,000 messages were posted to
newsgroups each day, and those messages were distributed to the approximately 190,000
computers or computer networks that participate in the Usenet newsgroup system ....
Collectively, almost 100,000 new messages (or articles) are posted to newsgroups each day."
Id.
4 See King, supra note 29, at 229.
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unintelligible "ciphertext. ' 4 9 The ciphertext is decrypted back into
plaintext by a recipient computer holding the secret key code.5" The two
methods of key encryption are symmetric and public key systems. 51
Symmetric key systems require one decryption code, thus entrusting all
users to keep the key from being exposed to third parties.5 2 Public key
systems involve two codes: one private and one public.53 In a public key
system, only one user holds the private key; anyone wishing to send
encrypted communications to that user can do so by using a
corresponding, public key.54 Symmetric keys and public keys have the
same length of "code,"5 5 but the symmetric system works faster, thus
making it better suited for complex communications such as a telephone
call or numerous pages of text.56 The strength of the code and its key
determine the ability of third parties, both law enforcement and
"hackers" 57 alike, to crack the code and disseminate the private
information. For example, a 40-bit key58 could be cracked in 12
seconds.59 And, in July 1998, a custom-made computer won a contest to
49 See Bernstein, 974 F. Supp. at 1292 (holding that scholarly encryption source
code developed by a mathematician is protected as expression under the First Amendment and
thus not subject to federal export restrictions).
5 id.
51 See generally, Hodkowski, supra note 20, at 228-33 (describing two types of
keys such as DES (a symmetric key system) and RSA (a public key system)).
52 See Hodkowski, supra note 20, at 228.
53 See Hodkowski, supra note 20, at 229.
54 See Hodkowski, supra note 20, at 229.
55 See Froomkin, supra note 23, at n.40.
56 See Froomkin, supra note 23, at n.40.
57 See Fulton, supra note 15, at 67. "A hacker is a computer pirate who violates
computer privacy by intercepting and possibly using telephone and credit card numbers, reading
electronic mail, listening in on cellular phone conversations, or by tapping into sensitive
[business and] government databases." Id.
M8 See Jaleen Nelson, Sledge Hammers and Scalpels: The FBI Digital Wiretap
Bill and its Effect on Free Flow of Information and Privacy, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1139, n.1
(1994). "Digital transmissions consist of electronic information that has been converted by a
computer into streams of digital bits. Bits, short for binary digits, are on-off conditions
representing the digits '0' and '1' that are read by computers." Id.
59 Ted Bridis, Code Breakers Crack Most Difficult Targets Breakthrough Puts
Financial Industry and Others on Alert, SUNDAY GAZETTE-MAIL, July 26, 1998, at Al1.
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break a 56-bit code in less than 3 days.60 Although no restrictions exist to
distribute encryption devices within the United States, the government
regulates encryption export by restraining "key strength" to a maximum
level of 40-bits.6'
Concerned with the proliferation of "strong" encryption over the
Internet,62 the FBI, the NSA, and the Clinton Administration have
proposed a variety of domestic controls utilizing key escrow schemes.
63
Members of the computer-scientific and commercial industries, however,
are fundamentally opposed to adopting forced encryption escrow
systems.
64
In its most basic form, a key escrow system envisions a common
third-party agent who holds the secret decryption keys in the event that law
enforcement officials need access to encrypted communications.65 Under
one Executive Branch proposal calling for the "Clipper III" key escrow
management system,66 a key escrow device would be built into the
60 Id. (stating that RSA Data Security, which sponsored the contest, endorses
unrestricted encryption stronger than 56-bits).61 Id. (stating that the Clinton administration policy prohibits exporting encryption
devices stronger than 40 bits).62 See Ashley Dunn, Mind & Machine: Governments and Encryption: Locking
You Out, Letting Them In (visited Oct. 8, 1997) <http://www.nytimes.com/yr/mo/day/cyber/
indexcyber.html> (stating that Phil Zimmerman's Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) offers private
citizens as well as criminals the 128-bit IDEA code over the Intemet RSA also offers a 2000-bit
source code over the Internet).63 id.
6See Hal Abelson et al., The Risks of Key Recovery, Key Escrow and Trusted
Third Parties (visited Nov. 1, 1997) <http://www.crypto.com/key_study/report.shtml>
(concluding in a final report dated 5/27/97 that escrow surveillance will greatly sacrifice personal
and business security); see also Andrew Mollison, Common Cause, High Tech Companies Join
Forces, AUSTNAM. STATESMAN, Aug. 3, 1998, at C I (reporting that in March 1998 a coalition
of companies including Microsoft Corp., Intel Corp., Sun Microsystems Corp. and others, joined
forces against encryption restrictions on exports under the auspices of Americans for Computer
Privacy). 65 See Froomkin, supra note 23, at 34 (stating that the availability of a "key" is an
easier decryption method than utilizing "brute force" decryption or implementing every key until
the correct key is simulated).
66 See Froomkin, supra note 23, at 52 (citing Bruce W. McConnell and Edward J
Appel, Co-Chairs, INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON CRYPTOGRAPHY POLICY, Draft Paper:
Enabling Privacy, Commerce, Security and Public Safety in the Global Information
Infrastructure, at 23 (May 20, 1996) ("White Paper') (available from the Office of Management
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software and the hardware of the "economic infrastructure., 67  For
example, all bank ATM and on-line transactions are protected by
encryption. Under a key management system, a third party "Certification
Authority" (CA) would register keys in an effort to authenticate each user
in a given bank transaction or communication.68 To be entrusted with the
storage of keys in escrow, the CA would be required to meet proposed
governmental licensing requirements.69 If this system is implemented, the
government will allow for unrestricted key strength, because the system
will promote more security on the Internet.70 Based on increased security,
71the government sees increased growth in electronically based commerce.
In its "White Paper" report for the economic infrastructure, the Office of
Management and Budget states that "some analysts suggest that as much
as 15 percent of all consumer purchases may be electronic by the turn of
the century, but this is unlikely without an information infrastructure that
enables secure communication and transactions.' 72
Opponents argue, however, that economic confidence in the
Internet has been undermined by the inherent ambiguity of privacy rights
for escrow participants. 73 Questions have arisen in terms of First and
Fourth Amendment "liability of 'escrow agents' in the event of the loss of
a key; the compromise of a key, such as where the escrow agent's database
is hacked or an employee is discovered to have sold key data; and the
good faith compliance with a facially valid, but actually invalid warrant.
... 74 While the need for national security is recognized by advocates and
critics of the escrow key systems alike, many cryptographers and computer
scientists warn that these security needs do not outweigh the need for
encryption privacy. "[Bluilding the secure infrastructure necessary...
and Budget, Executive Office of the President and available on-line at <http://www.
isse.gme.edu/pfarrelllnist/kmu.html) (The policy was reaffirmed by Vice President Gore on June
12, 1996 <http://csrc.ncsl.nist.gov/key escrow/admin.txt).
67 See Froomkin, supra note 23, at 51.
68 See Froomkin, supra note 23, at 51.69 See Froomkin, supra note 23, at 51.
70 See Froomkin, supra note 23, at 51.
71 See Froomkin, supra note 23, at 51.
72 See Froomkin, supra note 23, at 51-55.
73 Hodkowski, supra note 20, at 219.
74 Froomkin, supra note 23, at 38.
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would be enormously complex and beyond the experience and current
competency of the field. Human weakness... makes systems fragile.75
III. A GENERAL REVIEW OF PRIVACY AND ASSEMBLY WITHIN THE
INTERNET
It is human weakness combined with flaws in the electronic
systems and the law governing electronic communications that weigh
against an individual's right to private association through anonymity.76
The Internet, a space without time or borders, known as the great
equalizer by "connecting people of all ilk around the world,, 77 thrives on
the perceived privacy notion of anonymity.78  Computer users
automatically think that "once they get online, they somehow become
anonymous, and that their conversations are confidential. , 79 Based on the
enactment of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 0 it is apparent
that Congress believes that computer users have an expectation of privacy
when they engage in online communications or transactions.
A popular method of electronic communicating can be found in
a Bulletin Board System (BBS). A BBS is similar to the World Wide
Web"' of the Internet where subscribers dial in to a separate network
called Usenet (through communications software programs designed to
75 Jeri Clausing, FBI, Security Chiefs Ask Senate for Keys to all Encrypted Data,
CYBERTMES (July 10, 1997) <http://www.nytimes.com/yr/mo/day/cyber/indexcyber.html>
(quoting Peter Neumann, a scientist at the non-profit SRI Research Institute in Menlo Park, CA
and the editor of a highly influential Internet news group called comp.risks).
76 See Nelson, supra note 58, at 1174 (describing measures taken to ensure that
information and communication is kept private).
77 Beeson, supra note 16, at 23.
78 Hodkowski, supra note 20, at 235.
79 Id.; see also Fulton, supra note 15, at 66. "The Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 1986 ... closed the gaps left open by the Wiretap Act. Congress originally
enacted the 1986 Act in response to Watergate. The 1986 Act is the privacy shield protecting
e-mail .... Id.
80 Nelson, supra note 58, at 1174.
81 See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 836. "The World Wide Web was created to serve as
the platform for a global, online store of knowledge, containing information from a diversity of
sources and accessible to Internet users around the world." Id.
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access its unique network) or through an Internet Service Provider (ISP). 82
"A BBS functions somewhat like a stand alone web site, but without
graphics., 83 Most importantly though, a BBS acts as an information
source for BBS subscribers who participate in the many group chat and
post forums within a typical BBS.84 The wide range of forums available
to subscribers vary from those carrying legal issues and information, such
as "misc.legal," to sensitive issues such as sexual abuse at
"alt. sexual. abuse. recovery."9
5
When sending a posting to a BBS, each subscriber has the choice
of whether a personal posting will be identifiable by a traceable or
untraceable e-mail address ("header"). Headers, which can identify a
user's name, are distributed in exchange for identification by each user in
order to communicate to the Usenet posting site.86 Similar to a regular
letter envelope, a header "contains the user's name, the message's
geographic origin, as well as the time, date, and subject of the post."87
A subscriber can also choose to retain anonymity through the use
of a special server.8 8 To access the special server, a subscriber will send
a message to a "special address, and through various techniques, her
header will be stripped of any identifying features and assigned a
number., 8 9
In some cases, the only way for a subscriber to associate with a
specific BBS is anonymously. 90 In these instances, a person may need to
communicate privately to prevent disclosure of a connection to spousal
abuse, job-related harassment, unpopular political dissident groups,
s2 See Techweb, supra note 9, at <http://www.techweb.com/encyclopedia/
defineterm.cgi?LESSONSINTERNET>
83 id.
84 Id.; see also Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 835 (discussing that "[in its simplest forms,
"talk" allows one to one communications and "Internet Relay Chat" (or IRC) allows two or more
to type messages to each other .... ).
85 George P. Long, Who Are You?: Identity and Anonymity in Cyberspace, 55 U.
PITT. L. Rnv. 1177, 1181-84 (1994) (demonstrating the various capabilities of the Internet).
86 Id. (explaining that the header contains all the information needed for one
Internet site to deliver a message to another Usenet cite).
87 id.
8RId. at 1183-84.
89 Id.
90 Long, supra note 85, at 1183-84.
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corporate whistle-blowing, alcoholism, sexual abuse, or affiliation with
alternative religions.91 Without anonymity, a subscriber may fear reprisal,
humiliation, or intrusion.92 Anonymity draws people to associate over the
vast array of available forums on a BBS. This right to associate through
anonymity should be preserved. Because anonymity is a fragile entity in
the electronic communications universe, many users bypass a potentially
traceable special server, and opt for a more secure method of encryption.
93
"Encryption is in many ways the walls of cyberspace."
94
IV. THE LAW OF PRIVACY AND THE RIGHT TO ASSEMBLY
A. Common Law Applications
As electronic communications between people proliferate, so do
the expectations of privacy as applied to the law.95 Specifically, the right
to associate anonymously 96 is supported by the Supreme Court case
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson. 97 In NAACP, the Alabama Attorney
General wanted the complete membership list of the Alabama Chapter of
91 See Dennis Fowler, Treading the Boards: From Nature Worship to UFO's and
Alternative Science, COMPUTER SHOPPER (last modified June 1996) <http://www.zdnet.com/
pcweek> (describing the network PaganNet, "which links bulletin boards that explore alternative
and non-Christian faiths ranging from animism and Tibetan Buddhism to Witchcraft and Zen.");
see also Long, supra note 85, at 1184.92 See Long, supra note 85, at 1193.
93 See Ashley Dunn, Mind & Machine: Governments and Encryption: Locking
You Out, Letting Them In (last modified Oct. 8, 1997) <http://www.nytimes.com/library/
cyber/surf7100897mind.html> (noting that the ease of using encryption programs and the ability
of others to monitor communications on the Internet is pushing everyone into using encryption
devices, despite governmental efforts to restrict their use).94Id. (finding that "[t]he price of these key recovery proposals ... is an enormous
intrusion into individual privacy... [w]e should no more turn over the keys to our codes than
we should hand over a copy of our house keys to the local police.").
95 See Fulton, supra note 15, at 68 (explaining that large amounts of information
can be accessed and damaged without some protection mechanism, even one which can be
accessed by the government in the interest of national security).
96 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
97 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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the NAACP disclosed, including member's addresses.9" Alabama
contended that the NAACP was not in compliance with a state statute that
required foreign corporations to file such information with the Secretary
of State.99 The State further alleged that the Association "opened a
regional office and had organized various affiliates in Alabama; had
recruited members and solicited contributors within the State; had given
financial support and furnished legal assistance to Negro students seeking
admission to the state university; and had supported a Negro boycott of the
bus lines in Montgomery to compel the seating of passengers without
regard to race."' 00
The NAACP countered that the Alabama affiliates, as
independent, unincorporated affiliates to the nonprofit national
Association, "were exempt from corporate status under Alabama law."101
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
NAACP claimed that membership disclosure would "abridge the rights of
its rank-and-file members to engage in lawful association in support of
their common beliefs.', 10 2
The Supreme Court held that although the Alabama government's
action was not intended to restrict the right to assemble freely, an
unintended violation of the right may have resulted.'0 3 The Court
reasoned that without sufficient interest by the state to demand disclosure,
the "vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one's
associations" outweighed the state's efforts.10 4  Although the Court
recognized a state justification for congressional investigation for "chilling
of association," such justification was not recognized here. In this case,
lack of anonymity of NAACP members would subject them to "economic
reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other
manifestations of public hostility."' 0' The Court further found that the
Id. at 451.
9Id. at 451-52.
10 Id.
101 Id.
102 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,460.
103 Id. at 461.
1o4 Id. at 462.
105 id.
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effect of disclosure would inhibit growth of the association because
members would withdraw their memberships and potential members
would fear the consequences of disclosure. 106
The importance of an individual's privacy over the state's interest
in disclosure was again weighed by the Supreme Court in Whalen v.
Roe. 10 7  There, the Court addressed the constitutionality of forced
disclosure under the New York State Controlled Substances Act of
1972,108 which regulated the keeping of medical records of illegal drug
abusers. 109 A habitual drug user challenged the statute because the statute
intruded on the user's privacy when the user's school would receive
information of a drug-use history." 0 The Court ultimately held that, "there
was no basis for assuming that the state security provisions would be
improperly administered."'
Although the Court upheld the statute under the Fourteenth
Amendment, it distinguished routine medical record keeping, which is
freely and openly obtained by authorized health professionals, from that
of the information sought in NAACP. 112 The Court distinguished NAACP
from Whalen by stating "there was an uncontroverted showing of past
harm through disclosure.., an element which is absent here."' 13 The
Court also reasoned that NAACP, "protect[s] 'freedom of association for
the purpose of advancing ideas and airing grievances.'114
The Whalen Court also recognized that although relatively
undefined, the issue of privacy has been identified by the Court in an effort
to uphold an individual's right "to be free in his private affairs from
'0'1d. at 462-63.
107 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (stating that the patient-identification requirement is a
reasonable exercise of the state's police power).
log 1972 N.Y. Laws, c. 878; N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 3300 (McKinney, Supp.
1976-1977).
'9See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 591.
l"°Id. at 595.
1 Id. at 601.
112 Id. at 603-04 (asserting that the statute did not result in a total prohibition of
conduct).
"
3 Id. at n.32.
"4 Whalen, 429 U.S. at n.32.
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governmental surveillance and intrusion."'"5 Regarding the role of state
interest, the Court compared the potential disclosure of medical record
keeping from the Fourth Amendment privacy right under Katz v. United
States.116 The Court distinguished Katz from Whalen because unlike
health record in the hands of medical professionals, Katz "[i]nvolved
affirmative, unannounced, narrowly focused intrusions into individual
privacy during the course of criminal investigations.', 1 7 Ultimately, the
Court included in its opinion the famous remarks of Justice Brandeis
describing "'the right to be left alone' as 'the right most valued by
civilized man.' ' 118 Thus, in Whalen, the Court recognized that a personal
right exists in one's personal affairs as it relates to governmental intrusion.
Akin to NAACP, anonymous Usenet subscribers have joined an
association in furtherance of a common goal or experience. The
anonymous participant in a Usenet group such as
"alt. sexual. abuse. recovery" has chosen to remain anonymous to gain the
benefit of support by other anonymous sexual abuse victims." 9 The
Usenet BBS groups provide the privacy anonymous participants require
because of their fear of disclosure. 120 Similar to the Court's finding that
disclosure of NAACP members would dissuade ongoing memberships or
prevent new ones, the unavailability of anonymity in Usenet groups may
also suppress association.
B. The National Security Debate Over Encryption and a Backdrop of
Law for Current Statutory Applications to Electronic Communications
Based on the findings of both the NAACP and Whalen Courts, an
established relationship exists between the constitutional right to
..5 Id. at 599 n.24 (quoting J. Kurland, The Private I, U. CHi. MAG., Autumn
1976, at 7-8).
116 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967) (stating that "the Fourth Amendment protects
people not places ... [w]hat [a person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible
to the public, may be constitutionally protected.").
17 See Whalen,429 U.S. at n.32 (1977).
118 Id. at n.25 (quoting Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 227
U.S. 438 (1928)).
119 See Long, supra note 85, at 1193 (discussing the benefits of the Usenet).
120 See Long, supra note 85, at 1193.
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association 12 1 and to do so through anonymity. The question that remains
is whether an overriding state interest to compel disclosure outweighs
suppression of association. 122 However, state interests may not even be
an issue in anonymous association on the Internet.
Currently, government policy makers, including the executive
branch, the FBI, and the National Security Agency, contend that
substantial risk to national security exists due to the availability of "strong"
encryption codes that do not include a key escrow recovery system from
which law enforcement can wiretap. 123  Dorothy Denning, a leading
advocate for key escrow states: "[i]f we dismiss the intercept needs for
law enforcement and national security, society could suffer severe
economic and human losses resulting from a diminished capability to
investigate and prosecute organized crime and terrorism, and from a
diminished capability for foreign intelligence.' '124 The government reports
that once key escrow is in place, an individual's privacy will not be
compromised by discretionary governmental snooping. 125 Peggy Peterson,
a spokesperson for Congressional Representative Michael Oxley of the
House Intelligence Committee stated that "the notion that [key escrow]
would allow the FBI to browse through your personal communications is
way off base, .... the FBI would have to obtain a court order to conduct
any type of surveillance, just like they would in a wiretap case.'1 26
Although legislators in favor of key escrow plans contend that
computer users will be protected by the judicial procedure involved under
the Electronic Communications Interception and Interception of Oral
Communications Act ("Federal Wiretap Act"), 27 the Court of Appeals for
121 See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble .....
122 See Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460; Whalen, 429 U.S. at 589.
123 Before the Subcomm. on Tech., Env't., and Aviation of the Comm. on Science,
Space, and Tech., 103d Cong. 1 (1994) (statement of Dorothy E. Denning, Computer Science
Dept., Georgetown University).
124 id.
125 Jeri Clausing, Online Groups Mount an Effort to Fight Clinton on Encryption,
(visited Sept. 21, 1997) <http://search.nytimes.com/books/search/bin/fastweb?getdoc+cyber-
lib+cyber-lib+17392+5+wAAA+groups-and--clinton- encryption> (discussing battle over
effects of encryption technology).
126 
1.
"'See 18 U.S.C. § 2510-2522 (1994).
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the Fifth Circuit's decision in Steve Jackson Games v. United States Secret
Service12' demonstrates, (discussed infra), a privacy protection void under
the Federal Wiretap Act for these users. 129 In essence, the Steve Jackson
Games Court held that the Federal Wiretap Act did not protect the users
of a bulletin board system when the Secret Service conducted a
warrantless interception. 130
A brief history of the search and seizure laws as recognized by the
Supreme Court and legislators will provide a backdrop to the decision held
in Steve Jackson Games, as it pertains to privacy concerns protected by
encryption and the ability to associate in private.
The history of constitutional protections from unreasonable
governmental searches and seizures131 begins with Ex Parte Jackson.
132
In that case, the Supreme Court held that personal, sealed mail was the
equivalent to paper in one's home and could not be opened and examined
without a properly-issued warrant. 133 The Supreme Court later restricted
protection from searches and seizures in Olmstead v United States, 134 in
which it held that the Fourth Amendment could not be liberally construed
beyond the plain language of a search and seizure "to houses, persons,
papers and effects., 135  In Olmstead, the Court held that a private
telephone conversation outside of the home could not be construed as a
part of an individual's effects. 136 The Court recognized that the evidence,
obtained by "hearing" a conversation, as opposed to "physical entry," did
128 36 F.3d 457 (1994) (affirming lower court decision that federal seizures of
electronic bulletin board did not constitute a wiretap protected communication).
129 See Fulton, supra note 57, at 67. "The Electronic Communications Privacy Act
of 1986 presently is the most comprehensive statute applicable to computer communications,
there are many ambiguous provisions." Id.
'30 See Jackson, 36 F.3d at 457 (affirming lower court decision).
131 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
132 Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877) (holding that letters and sealed packages
subject to letter postage may only be searched under warrant).133 Id.
'3' 227 U.S. 438 (1928) (holding that private telephone conversations are protected
under the Fourth Amendment).
1351 d. at 465.
1 Id. at 464.
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not constitute a seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 137
Olmstead was later overturned by the Court in Katz v. United States. 1
38
The Katz Court concluded that "the Fourth Amendment protects people,
not places ... [w]hat [a person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.' ' 139 There,
the Court reasoned that an individual, whose telephone conversation was
improperly seized, had utilized a telephone to intentionally exclude "the
uninvited ear.' 14 0 The Court ultimately held that although federal agents
used proper restraint in obtaining precisely sought-after evidence, their
search and seizure was unreasonably secured without a proper judicial
warrant, and was thus unconstitutional. 141
C. Statutory Applications to Electronic Communications Demonstrate A
Void In Privacy Protection For Electronic Communicators
The holding in Katz prompted the legislative enactment of Title Ili
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 ("Federal
Wiretap Act"). 142 This act, however, originally only protected wire and
oral communications. 143  It was amended under the 1986 Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, to include electronic communications with
the Wire and Electronic Communications Interception and Interception of
Oral Communications Act (ECPA). 144
137 Id. (stating that there was no seizure because there was no entry of the houses
or offices of the defendants).
138 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (stating that "although a closely divided court supposed
in Olmstead that surveillance without any trespass and without the seizure of any material object
fell outside the ambit of the Constitution, we have since departed from [that] narrow view...
139 Id. at 351-52.
I40 d. at 352.1411id.
142 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1367, 2232, 2510-2521, 2701-2711, 3117, 3121-3127
(1994); see also Nelson, supra note 58, at 1168 (stating that Title 1iH of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 was enacted the year after the decision in Katz).
143 See Nelson, supra note 58, at 1168-69.
"'See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1994).
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The Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the ECPA in Steve Jackson
Games145 is pivotal to the suppression of associating in anonymity at issue
in this note. This note contends that because the Steve Jackson Games
Court upheld warrantless searches of "stored electronic communications,"
a group may not rely on government discretion to maintain membership
privacy in an electronically based association.1 46 Therefore, this note poses
that escrow-free encryption is the only reliable method to completely
protect associational privacy and anonymity in cyberspace. 147.
The Steve Jackson Games case illuminates the danger to
associational anonymity when privacy is subject to governmental
discretion. 148 In Steve Jackson Games, an electronic BBS known as
Illuminati was the subject of government surveillance. 149 Illuminati was
a BBS set up for computer users with a common interest in computer
games; it provided e-mail access as well. The owner and operator of the
BBS, Steve Jackson, and three Illuminati subscribers sued the U.S. Secret
Service under the Privacy Protection Act, 150 the Wire and Electronic
Communications Interception and Interception of Oral Communication
Act, 151 and the Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and
Transactional Records Access Act. 5 2 This suit was a response to the
seizure of many articles, documents, an unpublished manuscript, and 300
computer disks owned by Steve Jackson. 53 Government authorities also
seized the computer that ran the Illuminati BBS and its contents "including
14' 816 F. Supp. 432 (W.D. Tex. 1993), affd, 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding
that seizure of electronic communications is allowed in compliance with statutory provisions).
146 Loren Siegel,ACLU Special Report: Big Brother in the Wires[,] Wiretapping
in the Digital Age (visited Oct. 1998) <http://www.aclu.org/issues/eyber/
wiretapbrother.html#credit> (stating that no serious crimes involving national security have
been prevented or solved by electronic surveillance, including the bombings of the World Trade
Center, the Unabomber, or Oklahoma City bombing).
14 7 Id.
148id.
149See Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 462 (stating "[b]ut, when interpreting a
statute as complex as the Wiretap Act, which is famous (if not infamous) for its lack of clarity.
"o See 42 U.S.C. § 2000 aa(b)(3) (1994).
... See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1994).
'
52 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (1994).
153 See Steve Jackson Games, 818 F. Supp. at 439.
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public announcements, published newsletter articles submitted to the
public for review, public comment on the articles submitted and electronic
mail containing both private and public communications, as well as
undelivered documents" owned by subscribers to the BBS. 1
54
The Secret Service began its investigation of the Illuminati BBS
from a reported hacker intrusion to a sensitivb "911" security document
on the Bell South Security System. 155 The Secret Service traced the
security document's illegal availability on an Illinois BBS called
"Phoenix," which was operated by Lyod Blakenship. 156 When the Secret
Service determined that Blakenship was also a co-systems operator of the
Illuminati BBS, the investigation team assumed that the sensitive
document was also available to hackers through the Illuminati system. 1
57
Although the investigation team was familiar with the use of computer
bulletin board systems, no one actually dialed in to Illuminati to determine
whether illegal activity was present. 15' The only contact with the
Illuminati bulletin board system was obtained through a printout which
read:
Greetings Mortal! You have entered the secret computer
system of Illuminati, the online home of the world's oldest
and largest secret conspiracy.
5124474449300/1200/2400/ BAUD fronted by Steve
Jackson Games Incorporated [-] Fnord.159
The court noted that "the evidence in this case strongly suggests Agent
Foley, without further investigation, misconstrued this information to
believe the Illuminati bulletin board [system] was similar in purpose to the
[Phoenix bulletin board system], which provided information to and was
used by hackers.' 160 The court additionally found that without consent of
the parties involved, the Secret Service had read and destroyed, either
'5 Id. at 440.
"' Id. at 435.
1561d.
151 Id. at 436.
158 See Steve Jackson Games, 816 F. Supp. at 435-36.
... Id. at 436.
160ld.
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purposefully or inadvertently, 162 pieces of private e-mail, some of which
had not been delivered to the intended recipients.161
The court ultimately held that although the Secret Service
obtained proper warrants in good faith, it exceeded its authority under the
Privacy Protection Act.162 When the Secret Service seized Jackson's
documents, it had seized an unpublished manuscript, thus violating the
statute.163 The court also held that the Secret Service had exceeded its
authority under the Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and
Transactional Records Access Act. 164 This violation occurred when the
Secret Service seized Illuminati electronic communications without
notifying 165 the users of that service or making back-up copies 166 of the
subscriber's seized documents. 167 The court noted that with regard to a
remote computing service, such as a BBS, the Secret Service can only
'disclose' contents, not 'seize' the contents."1
68
The court, however, held that the Secret Service had not exceeded
its authority under the ECPA. 169 The court found that under the language
of the statute, the "private communications" of computer bulletin board
system users were not protected by the "intercept" language of 18 U.S.C.
§ 251 1(1)(a). 170
161 See Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 459.
162 Id. at 440; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000 aa(a) (stating that the Privacy Protection
Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000aa, dictates: "Notwithstanding any other law, it shall be unlawful for a
government officer or employee, in connection with the investigation ... of a criminal offense
to search for or seize any work product materials possessed by a person reasonably believed to
have a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, broadcast, or other similar form of
public communication .... ).
16 3 See Steve Jackson Games, 816 F. Supp. at 439-40.
164 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (1994); see also Steve Jackson Games, 816 F.
Supp at 442 (stating "[The agents'] conduct exceeded the government's authority under the
statute.").
165 See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b) (1994).
" See 18 U.S.C. § 2704 (1994).
167 See Steve Jackson Games, 816 F. Supp. at 440.
18Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (1994).
169 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1994).
170 See Steve Jackson Games, 816 F. Supp. at 442.
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The reason for this holding is best understood by the Fifth
Circuit's decision affirming the district court decision. 17' The Fifth Circuit
first examined the Federal Wiretap Statute § 251 l(1)(a) which focuses on
"intentionally intercept[ing] . . . any wire, oral, or electronic
communication."' 172 The court found that an "electronic communication"
is defined as "any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data,
or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by wire, radio,
electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects
interstate or foreign commerce .... The court next looked at the
language for the definition of "wire communication" which reads:
[A]ny transfer made in whole or in part through the use of
facilities for the transmission of communications by the
aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the
point of origin and the point of reception (including the
use of such connection in a switching station) ... and
such term includes any electronic storage of such
communication.'74
The third and final definition from court focused on "intercept."17
5
According to the court, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1) defines "intercept" as "the
aural [voice] or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic,
or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical or
other device.'1 76 The court ultimately held that because Congress did not
include the terms "electronic storage" in its definition of electronic
communication in the amended statute, and because it did include such
language in the definition of "wire communication," the government is
free to "intercept" a non-aural or stored transfer. In this case, data
transmission in storage included the electronically stored messages on the
filuminati BBS. 17
7
171 See Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 458.
172 Id. at 460.
173 id.
174 Id. at 458; 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (1994).
175 See Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 460.
176 Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1994).
177 See Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 458.
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Thus, the BBS subscribers to Illuminati were intercepted by the
government without a warrant for wiretap. The fact that no lawful
protection of privacy exists against the government interception of
electronic communications only increases the need for escrow-free
encryption. Without the availability of escrow-free encryption, bulletin
board users such as those in Steve Jackson Games can be suppressed from
associating anonymously. Suppression will chill the electronic
communications users right to association, right to privacy, and the right
to be left alone.
V. CONCLUSION
At the time of the government's interception on the Illuminati
BBS, 365 subscribers were members to that system. 178 Each one of the
computer users relied in good faith that their anonymity would be
protected from discretionary governmental intrusion.1 79  Without the
statutory recourse of wiretap "intercept" protection, computer users must
have a viable option to ensure their privacy.' 80 Encryption provides that
protection.18 1  Although the government is responsible for national
security, it is also responsible for maintaining the constitutional rights of
its citizens. '8 2 And in light of key escrow proposals, this debate 83 should
factor in the weight of the Steve Jackson Games decision. 184
178 See Steve Jackson Games, 816 F. Supp. at 434.
"' See Id. at 432-33 (stating the premise for which the lawsuit was brought against
the United States Secret Service).
18o See Siegel, supra note 146.
181 Jeri Clausing, Security Chiefs Ask Senate for Keys to all Encrypted Data
(visited July 10, 1997) <http://www.nytimes.con/yr/mo/day/cyber/indexcyber.html> (citing the
commentary of Peter Neumann, a scientist at the non-profit SRI Research Institute in Menlo
Park, CA and the editor of a highly influential Internet news group called comp.risks).
"82 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 359-60 (Douglas, J., concurring) (stating that "national
security" matters should not receive a "wholly unwarranted green light" for warrantless
eavesdropping because unlike a magistrate, the Executive Branch is not a neutral power, and
thus, where Fourth Amendment rights apply to "gamblers" and "spies and saboteurs" alike, the
Executive Branch cannot assume both positions of prosecutor and magistrate in cases of "spies
and saboteurs").
1s3 Siegel, supra note 146 (stating that the debate over encryption escrow is being
wagged between "the Justice Department, the FBI, the National Security Council, the Drug
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If BBS users who assemble under anonymity cannot expect
protection under the current laws regarding governmental wiretap
surveillance, the effect will be to suppress the ability to associate
anonymously online. 185 The government's ability to "intercept" certain
electronic communications without legislative resttaint will have a chilling
effect on future computer users who turn to the Internet for advice,
support, or unrestricted debate. 186 For the future, the role of encryption
should remain unrestrained by government escrow devices, thus leaving
a viable option to computer users to communicate in anonymity.
Gwynne B. Barrett
Enforcement Administration, and many state and local law enforcement organizations" on one
side and "the communications industry, the country's leading cryptographers and computer
scientists, and privacy and civil liberties advocates" on the other side).
.
84 Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 457.
185 See Siegel, supra note 146.
186 See Froomkin, supra note 34 at 817-18; see also NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449 (1958Xreasoning that membership list disclosure would have a chilling effect on current and
future members of the association).
